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No Right to Classified
Public Whistleblowing
ERIC R. BOOT*
Abstract. Given the crucial role unauthorized disclosures can play in uncovering
grave government wrongdoing, it makes sense to search for a defense of justified
cases of what I call “classified public whistleblowing.” The question that concerns
me is what form such a defense should take. The main claim will be a negative one,
namely, that a defense of whistleblowing cannot be based on individual rights, be
they legal or moral, though this is indeed the most commonly proposed defense. In
closing, I will outline a more appealing alternative, namely, a justification defense.
1. Introduction
Edward Snowden’s disclosures sparked a global debate on the right balance
between security and privacy, and revealed mass government surveillance of
American citizens, which has been ruled to be unconstitutional and illegal.1
Following his revelations, Congress voted for the USA Freedom Act, which
introduced important reforms to the NSA’s bulk data collection program, while the
United Nations General Assembly (2013) declared online privacy to be a funda-
mental human right.
This is just one recent, particularly well-known example of the type of
whistleblowing I will be concerned with. I will not discuss internal whistleblowing
or disclosures to the appropriate external oversight bodies. Instead, the focus of the
present paper will be on unauthorized public disclosures (typically to the media) of
classified government documents. I refer to such whistleblowing as classified public
* This article is part of the research project “Democratic Secrecy: A Philosophical Study of the
Role of Secrecy in Democratic Governance,” which received funding from the European
Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme (GA 639021. PI: Dr. D. Mokrosinska).
1 U.S. district court judge Richard Leon found the NSA’s data collection program to be unconsti-
tutional for violating the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures
(Savage 2015); a federal appeals court ruled that the NSA’s bulk collection of communications
records was illegal (Stempel 2015).
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whistleblowing.2 Though such unauthorized disclosures are illegal, they do provide
a crucial public service, as the above-mentioned consequences of Snowden’s disclo-
sures show. When, for example, oversight (by the courts or special committees) of
the intelligence community fails, what means are left to address wrongdoing?
Unauthorized disclosures by whistleblowers will often be our best and only chance
of finding out about, and ultimately addressing, government wrongdoing. For this
reason, many argue that whistleblowers ought to enjoy some measure of legal
protection, lest a chilling effect cause potential whistleblowers to refrain from
disclosing government wrongdoing in the future, leaving the public ignorant of
such wrongdoing.
In this article, I will assume (but not argue) that classified public whistleblowing
can be morally justified in certain cases. The question that concerns me in the
present paper is what form a defense of justified whistleblowing should take. The
main claim will be that a defense of whistleblowing cannot be based on individual
rights, be they legal or moral, though this is indeed the most commonly proposed
defense. Proponents of a legal rights-based defense of whistleblowing argue that
the legal right to freedom of expression—understood broadly as a right to seek,
receive, use, and impart information—covers acts of whistleblowing (provided
certain conditions are met). In Section 2, I argue against such an individual legal
rights-based defense of whistleblowing, because, first, there can be no such thing
as a legal right to break the law; second, the conception of rights involved in the
defense deviates significantly (and unappealingly) from the common understand-
ing of rights; and third, the individual rights-based defense does not do justice to
the fact that the importance of unauthorized disclosures lies in its public importance
rather than in individual liberty; as a result, the defense ought not to be based on
individual rights but on the whistleblowers’ public role.
There might, however, be a moral right to classified public whistleblowing.
In Section 3, I will consider whether David Lefkowitz’s argument for a moral right
to civil disobedience can be applied to the case of classified public whistleblowing.
Ultimately, I will conclude that it cannot, given the significant differences between
civil disobedience and whistleblowing. In particular, I will argue that the degree of
wrongdoing involved in wrongful exercises of a moral right to whistleblowing
leads us to reject such a right. If we wish to provide whistleblowers with a measure
of protection, we must therefore look elsewhere. In Section 4, I will briefly discuss
a justification defense as the most appealing alternative.
2. Problems with the Individual Legal Rights-Based Defense
The existence of whistleblower protection legislation in many countries shows that
individuals have a legal right to engage in internal whistleblowing (whereby the
reporting of wrongdoing is carried out within the organization) and external
whistleblowing through the appropriate supervisory bodies. When it comes to
disclosing state secrets to the public, however, whistleblower protection legislation
2 “Classified” in the sense that state secrets are involved; “public” in the double sense that the
information disclosed concerns state secrets and that it is disclosed to the public (typically via the
media), as opposed to an internal or external supervisory body. From now on, when I speak of
“whistleblowing” I will intend classified public whistleblowing, unless indicated otherwise.
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as well as international standards are either considerably less clear, or they outright
exclude any legal protection for those who make such disclosures. Thus, the Coun-
cil of Europe’s 2014 recommendation Protection of Whistleblowers merely states that
disclosures to the media ought to be protected “when necessary” (COE 2014, § 14).
The 2009 Dutch law on the addressing of wrongdoing by civil servants (including
those in the intelligence community) (Binnenlandse Zaken 2009) does not even
mention the option of going to the media.3 The 2016 general Dutch whistleblower
protection law states that the protection of disclosures to the media will need to be
decided on a case-by-case basis.4 By contrast, the UK’s Official Secrets Act 1989
flatly denies (former) members of the security services the right, “even as a last
resort and even in the face of the most serious iniquity, to make a general disclo-
sure” (Bowers 2007, 315). Similarly, in the United States, federal government
employees in general, let alone whistleblowers from the intelligence community,
are granted no protection from retaliation if the information disclosed has been
properly classified.5
There is thus no separate legal right to engage in what I have termed “classified
public whistleblowing” in any of the above-mentioned countries.6 In order to
attempt to protect whistleblowers from retaliation nonetheless, lawyers and legal
scholars tend to argue that unauthorized disclosures may enjoy protection under
the right to freedom of expression. Accordingly, whenever a whistleblowing
case has been brought before the European Court of Human Rights, the defendant
has claimed that the state has violated her Article 10 right to freedom of expression.
Similarly, in the American context, defendants may appeal to their First
Amendment rights (see, e.g., Morse 2010). Proponents of a right to whistleblowing
included in the right to freedom of expression construe the latter right broadly as a
“right to seek, receive, use, and impart information” (Open Society Foundations
2013, Principle 1(a)). As a result, sanctions against whistleblowers are described as
violations of rights, provided certain conditions are met.7
This appears to be the most straightforward defense of whistleblowing. It is also
an extremely appealing defense, as the importance of free speech in democratic
societies is generally recognized: without the free flow of information, public
debate would be impoverished and political accountability impaired. Despite the
apparent appeal of this defense, however, I will argue that an individual legal
rights-based defense of whistleblowing has some serious conceptual and practical
difficulties and must therefore be rejected.
First, how is it possible to reconcile the claim that “there is a legal right to
whistleblowing” with the general prohibition of whistleblowing? Assuming that
3 Binnenlandse Zaken, Besluit melden vermoeden van misstand bij Rijk en Politie (Decree regulating
the addressing of wrongdoing by civil servants), 2009.
4 Voorstel van wet van de leden Van Raak, Fokke, Schouw, Segers, Ouwehand en Klein tot
wijziging van de Wet Huis voor klokkenluiders (Proposal for an amendment to the Dutch
Whistleblowing Protection Law). Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 34105, 7. p. 23.
5 5 USC § 2302(b)(8) (2012).
6 Indeed, to my knowledge no country grants citizens a right to legal protection from retaliation
following a public unauthorized disclosure of classified materials.
7 Different scholars and courts list different conditions. Some examples are: harm minimization,
exhaustion of legal alternatives, the whistleblower’s good faith, and of course that the disclosed
information must contain evidence of wrongdoing of public concern.
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the proponents of a right to whistleblowing (subsumed under the right to freedom
of expression) accept that there is such a thing as legitimate state secrecy and that,
as a result, the disclosure of state secrets ought (generally) to be prohibited, a
general right to unauthorized disclosures, on the basis of which the whistleblower
would enjoy legal protection, is extremely problematic. Once again, assuming that
the unauthorized disclosure of state secrets ought to be illegal, a legally recognized
right to whistleblowing would amount to the law recognizing a right to deliber-
ately break the law. Even the staunchest defenders of civil disobedience have been
forced by similar concerns to deny that there is such a thing as a legal right to civil
disobedience,8 and I cannot see why we ought to conclude any differently in the
case of whistleblowing.
Second, the manner in which the individual rights-based defense is usually set
up already shows that a possible right to whistleblowing would in no way be a
right as we ordinarily understand it. For example, the European Court of Human
Rights, in its first case dealing with classified public whistleblowing, held that, in
order to ascertain whether an unauthorized disclosure will enjoy protection under
the right to freedom of expression, the harm suffered by the public authority as a
result of the disclosure may not outweigh “the interest of the public in having the
information revealed.”9 In other words, the Court took the view that if we wish to
determine whether a particular restriction of the right to freedom of expression is
proportionate, we need to weigh the harm inflicted by the disclosure upon the
public authority against the interest of the public in receiving the information
involved. Similarly, the Tshwane Principles on National Security and the Right to
Information argue for some legal protection for whistleblowers by appealing to a
general right to information (which includes a right to free expression), but ulti-
mately the authors frame their defense of unauthorized disclosures in terms of a
balancing act between two public goods:10 “the law should provide a public inter-
est defense if the public interest in disclosure of the information in question out-
weighs the public interest in non-disclosure.”11
In these two characteristic examples, one can see the language employed drifting
away from individual rights and towards public goods. To be sure, many rights,
including the right to freedom of expression, contain provisions limiting their
scope in order to account for the rights of others, public health, national security,
and the like. However, these other goods are usually weighed against the right in
question. For example, in the case of hate speech the importance of the individual’s
ability to freely exercise her right to freedom of expression is weighed against the
rights of others and public safety, among other things. The proposed defense of
whistleblowing, however, is different. Here the decision as to whether an act of
8 See, e.g., Brownlee 2012, 123. Brownlee does recognize a moral right to civil disobedience,
which is equally puzzling, because, presumably, moral rights ought to be translatable into legal
rights (though Brownlee rejects this presumption: ibid., 122ff.).
9 Guja v. Moldova [GC], no. 14277/04, § 76, ECHR 2008.
10 This shift in language from fundamental rights to public goods is telling in itself: By, ulti-
mately, appealing to public goods rather than rights, the drafters of the Tshwane Principles,
inadvertently to be sure, demonstrate that a defense based on rights is not a sensible approach.
11 Open Society Foundations 2013, Tshwane Principle 43(a). A similar approach can be found in
Kagiaros 2015.
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whistleblowing ought to enjoy legal protection depends on the outcome of a
balancing exercise, weighing the public good in disclosure against the public good
in non-disclosure. The difference is that in the latter case the whistleblower’s
supposed right to disclose classified information (subsumed under the right to
freedom of expression) does not enter the equation, and is apparently appealed to
for mere rhetorical purposes. Furthermore, although the right to freedom of
expression is indeed subject to the above-mentioned limiting provisions, its
structure still differs fundamentally from that of a supposed right to unauthorized
disclosures: The former right always allows one to express oneself as one wishes,
except in a few limiting cases (which, furthermore, “must be narrowly interpreted
and the necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established”);12 by
contrast, the latter right never allows the behavior the right supposedly protects,
except if specific conditions are met.
The legal rights-based defense of whistleblowing thus appeals to a right to
whistleblowing, yet this supposed right apparently plays no (or a negligible) role
in the balancing exercise that is to decide whether a particular unauthorized
disclosure ought to be protected by that right. Clearly, this approach to a defense
based on legal rights involves a notion of rights that deviates significantly from
how we habitually understand them. The function of rights is to ensure a sphere of
autonomous action for the right-holder. Accordingly, my right to X imposes a
correlative duty on all others (in the case of universal rights such as the right to
freedom of expression) not to interfere with my exercise of this right. To state,
then, that whether or not I will be allowed to exercise my right to X depends on
the outcome of an intricate balancing exercise whereby various public goods are
weighed against each other is essentially to state that I do not have the right to X.
We need not even go as far as Dworkin and state that rights must always trump
all other interests, such as general welfare, national security, or public health
(Dworkin 2011, 329). Most scholars agree, however, that one typical characteristic
of rights (certainly of fundamental rights) is their peremptory force:13 The assertion
of a right is not just another consideration to take into account, but a particularly
weighty one that, in principle, cuts off further debate concerning what is to be
done. All the more puzzling (and somewhat ironic) then that, instead of asserting
at least the prima facie peremptory force of the right to whistleblowing, human
rights lawyers and scholars (of all people) are proposing a right to whistleblowing,
the enjoyment of which depends on an intricate process of balancing multiple
interests, whereby the right itself plays no role of any significance. In this manner,
the peremptory force that sets rights apart in normative discourse is lost.
A third and final point is that basing a defense of whistleblowing on individual
rights misrepresents our reasons for wishing to protect whistleblowers. The reason
is not that engaging in unauthorized disclosures constitutes a fundamental interest
all people have that therefore ought to be protected (as is the case of fundamental
rights). Rather, the reason is that unauthorized disclosures are often our main
12 Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, § 63, Series A no. 239.
13 See, e.g., Joseph Raz (1986, 192) on the interest side of the rights debate—stating that rights
occupy a special place in normative discourse due to their peremptory force—as well as will
theorists like H. L. A. Hart (1955, 191), for whom rights are about protecting a system of equal
freedom, the great importance of which precludes any balancing of rights against public goods.
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source for finding out about government wrongdoing. As Yochai Benkler (2014,
305) puts it: “The defense [of whistleblowing] is premised on the proposition that
the leaker serves a public role, so the defense is public and systemic, rather than
individual-rights based.” As a result, an individual rights-based defense does not
accurately explain the importance of whistleblowing and misrepresents our
reasons for wishing to offer whistleblowers some protection.
3. No Moral Right to Classified Public Whistleblowing
Having ruled out a defense based on a legal right to whistleblowing, we might
consider the possibility of a moral right to whistleblowing. Given that we ordinarily
assume that it must be possible for a moral right to become a legal right,14 and
given that there can be no legal right to break the law, it seems there can also be no
moral right to whistleblowing. Some scholars, however, have contested this
“legal-right presumption,” arguing for the existence of certain moral rights despite
the fact that they cannot be translated into legal rights.15 Though it may not pro-
vide much of an actual defense to whistleblowers, let us nonetheless explore this
option. I will do so as follows: I will start by assuming that for there to be a moral
right to whistleblowing, it must at least not be morally wrongful. Subsequently, I
will give three reasons why the act of whistleblowing constitutes a pro tanto wrong,
leading me to conclude that, as a result, there cannot be a moral right to whistle-
blowing. Perhaps, however, one could avoid this conclusion by positing a moral
right to do wrong. In considering this possibility, I begin by expounding the
argument for such a right in general, after which I offer some points of criticism,
which render it problematic. Setting these worries aside, however, I will next
consider whether specifically the defense of civil disobedience based on a moral
right to do wrong, as expounded by David Lefkowitz, can be used to argue for a
moral right to classified public whistleblowing. I will argue that, given significant
differences between civil disobedience and whistleblowing, it cannot.
3.1 Classified Public Whistleblowing as a Pro Tanto Wrong
Presumably, for there to be a moral right to whistleblowing, the act of whistleblow-
ing must be either morally obligatory or morally permissible, but not morally
wrongful. Classified public whistleblowing, however, does not meet this condition
as it constitutes a pro tanto wrongful act for three reasons: It involves a breach of (1)
promissory obligations, (2) role obligations, and (3) the obligation to respect the
democratic allocation of power.16 Regarding the first reason, we may start by
noting that civil servants are often made to swear an oath stating that they will
refrain from disclosing classified documents that they encounter in the course of
their work. Unauthorized disclosures constitute a violation of this promissory
obligation and are therefore pro tanto wrongful. For reasons of space, I cannot go
14 Raz 1979, 262: “if there is such a moral right then there is a presumption for giving it legal
recognition.”
15 Brownlee 2012, 122–3. The right Brownlee has in mind is the right to civil disobedience.
16 Elsewhere (Boot 2017) I have elaborately argued for these three reasons to view classified
public whistleblowing as a pro tantowrongful act.
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into the vast body of literature regarding promises and how, exactly, they give rise
to obligations to keep them.17 Instead, I will briefly present an argument that is
largely Kantian in nature. Kant (1996a, AK 4:424) views the breaking of one’s
promise as a violation of a perfect duty, since the maxim of this action cannot even
be reasonably conceived as a universal law. After all, universalizing the maxim to
make false promises whenever it suits oneself would result in the disappearance of
the very condition of promising, namely, that the promisee believes the promisor
will deliver on her promise (ibid., AK 4:422). We find a similar account of promis-
sory obligations in Rawls, except that it is framed in terms of the duty of fair play:
He argues that if you benefit from a just institution of promising, whenever you
make a promise under this institution you incur an obligation to preserve the insti-
tution by fulfilling it, lest you become a free-rider (Rawls 1999, 305). Naturally, to
say that promise-making has normative consequences is not to say that one could
simply promise to do anything, however reprehensible, and be considered under
an obligation to keep one’s promise, even if to do so would involve grave wrong-
doing. I am not bound to kill an innocent child just because, to paraphrase Lady
Macbeth, “I had so sworn.” There is, however, a significant difference between
promising to do a (by definition) immoral act (say, killing an innocent person) and
promising to respect the classified nature of certain government documents.
In principle, the latter promise does not bind one to perform morally reprehensible
acts, particularly if we presuppose (nearly) just conditions.
Regarding the second set of obligations prohibiting whistleblowing, we may start
with some general remarks about role obligations. To start with, their scope is
limited to the role-occupants. Furthermore, their content is determined by the
institutional role in question. Finally, the normative force of role obligations
originates in the role itself (Hardimon 1994, 334). In other words, role obligations
do not rely on external moral justification.18 As a result, it is possible for role
agents (such as civil servants) to be pro tanto obligated to perform acts they con-
sider to be wrongful. In such cases, the norms of their institutional role command
them to perform acts, which they reject on the basis of external moral norms.
According to the civic conception19 of civil servants’ role obligations, which I
endorse, a civil servant’s ultimate responsibility is to the democratic constitutional
17 For an excellent overview of the state of the art concerning research on promise-making, see
Sheinman 2011.
18 Though this is a common understanding of role obligations, some would dispute the claim
that role obligations do not need to be prescribed by external moral rules. A. John Simmons, for
example, views the prescriptions of a particular role to be morally neutral. He maintains that
they can be morally binding on us only if the obligation in question can be justified externally.
Such an external justification would be independent of the role prescribing the obligation
(Simmons 1979, 16–23). I would argue, however, that Simmons’s reductionist approach to role
obligations is mistaken. This becomes apparent when we consider roles we do not assume
voluntarily, such as the role of brother or son. A reductionist such as Simmons would have to
trace the normative force of our duties to our parents or siblings to a more general obligation-
generating principle, such as promise-making, consent, gratitude, or some supposedly fair
distribution of burdens and benefits within a particular family. Instead, a non-reductionist
would argue that our duties to our parents or siblings originate simply and solely in our roles as
son or brother. Indeed, for most people, asking for an additional justification of the normative
force of our duties toward our family members would involve “one thought too many.”
19 I borrow this term from Bovens 1998, 149.
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state as such.20 Ordinarily, a civil servant best fulfills this responsibility by obeying
her superiors, thus enhancing democratic accountability21 and helping to ensure
the rule of law.22 Consequently, civil servants are role-obligated to obey their supe-
riors’ orders, including orders to refrain from disclosing classified information.
Finally, the obligation to respect the democratic allocation of power prohibits
civil servants from whistleblowing. The idea is that whistleblowers usurp the
power to decide what is and what is not a legitimate state secret, whereas this is
properly the prerogative of democratically elected officials. These officials have
received a mandate from the people to decide, among many other things, on mat-
ters of state secrecy, whereas those engaged in whistleblowing have been elected
neither by the people nor by its representatives. As Rahul Sagar Sagar (2013, 114)
puts it: “When unauthorized disclosures occur, vital decisions on matters of
national security are effectively being made by private actors, an outcome that
violates the democratic ideal that such decisions should be made by persons or
institutions that have been directly or indirectly endorsed by citizens.”
3.2. A Moral Right to Do Wrong?
Despite the fact that these are pro tanto obligations which are liable to be defeated
by weightier moral reasons, possibly rendering a particular act of whistleblowing
justified, they do establish the pro tanto wrongfulness of whistleblowing. As a
consequence, arguing that there ought, nonetheless, to be a moral right to whistle-
blowing seems to be ruled out, as we would, in effect, be proposing a moral right
to do wrong. However, there are those who argue for precisely such a right. They
do so on the basis of what they perceive to be the function of rights. The idea is
that a right has nothing to say about the moral value of this or that action; all it
does, is protect decision-making in a particular area, in which the agent is to be
safe from interference: “To protect decision-making is not to provide a reason for
the making of any particular decision” (Waldron 1981, 35). It follows that one has a
right23 to participate in morally wrongful behavior: One thus has a right to partici-
pate in a demonstration in support of a political party with openly racist views;
one has a right to donate nothing to charity though one has the means to do so;
20 It must be noted here that I am supposing (near)ideal circumstances, in which the state is
reasonably just and democratic, policy is generally drafted for the public interest, and officials
are mostly not corrupt but in which, nevertheless, cases of grave injustice may occur.
21 After all, policy-makers can only be fully accountable if their policy plans are being executed
in a loyal and diligent manner by public servants.
22 As policy is put into effect by a great many civil servants, chaos would likely ensue if each of
them were to act in accordance with her own moral beliefs rather than with institutional
guidelines. As a consequence, citizens would be left in uncertainty regarding what they may
legitimately expect of their government and their fellow citizens (as well as vice versa), thus
endangering the rule of law. By contrast, strict compliance with superiors’ orders can function
as a bulwark against arbitrariness and thus help provide and maintain legal certainty.
23 Though perhaps one ought to speak of Hohfeldian “privileges,” rather than rights. According
to Hohfeld, if A has a privilege to U, then A is under no duty not to U. Furthermore, if A has a
privilege to U, it follows that B has no right (or claim) that A refrain from U-ing. In short,
Hohfeldian privileges (at times also referred to as “liberties”) thus show what the holder of the
privilege has no duty not to do (Hohfeld 1913, 32ff.). So, for instance, I am under no duty to
provide strangers with accurate directions to the railway station. Conversely, they possess no
right (i.e., no claim) to receive correct information fromme.
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one has a right to deliberately provide false information to hapless strangers asking
for directions. Having a right in these cases does not imply any judgment concern-
ing the moral worth (or rather lack thereof) of the actions protected by the right:
It merely ensures protection from interference in a particular sphere of action.
According to its proponents, the moral right to do wrong is of great importance
because without it we would not be able to make truly autonomous choices: We
would not, in other words, be able to freely determine the course of our life and
the content of our character. If our rights only grant us protection from interference
with rightful conduct, then we are no longer able to make meaningful choices in
life. Making morally sensitive choices is central to our self-constitution: They play a
large part in determining who we are. If we are not free to make morally wrong
decisions, but may instead only perform morally obligatory and permissible acts,
then the scope of our freedom of choice is greatly restricted, essentially robbing us
of any meaningful choice at all (Herstein 2012, 355). As Jeremy Waldron (1981, 36)
puts it, rights would then only protect free choice in those areas of conduct that
concern the “banalities and trivia of human life.”
There are, however, serious concerns about this supposed moral right to do
wrong, especially concerning the value of autonomous wrongdoing. Autonomy,
according to the advocates of such a right, resides in the unimpeded freedom to
choose to act however one wishes, whether one chooses morally right or morally
wrongful actions. Therefore, if one’s freedom to choose is reduced to actions that
are morally required or merely permissible, the scope of one’s freedom of choice is
diminished, resulting in a loss of autonomy. However, one might argue that auton-
omously choosing to perform a wrongful act is an oxymoron, as it was for Kant.
Autonomy, for Kant, resides in obeying our own lawgiving will, which, ideally, is
synonymous with the moral law. An immoral act can thus per definitionem not be
an autonomous act (Kant 1996b, AK 6:226; 1996a, AK 4:447). If, however, one finds
Kant’s rather thick understanding of autonomy unappealing, one may point out
with Raz that “autonomy is valuable only if exercised in pursuit of the good” (Raz
1986, 381; emphasis added). It follows that, though wrongful acts may still be
viewed as autonomous, they lack any value. Indeed, one might go further and
argue that autonomously choosing to do wrong is morally worse than doing so
non-autonomously. If this is the case—if autonomous wrongdoing has no moral
value or even a negative moral value—then what reason could we possibly have in
advocating for a right to do wrong? Or as Raz puts it: “Since autonomy is valuable
only if it is directed at the good, it supplies no reason to provide, nor any reason to
protect, worthless let alone bad options” (ibid. 411).
Furthermore, one could reply to the proponents of a right to do wrong that,
contrary to what they claim, choosing among morally permissible actions includes
a great many relevant choices (Galston 1983, 322). Think of choosing a faith, a
political party, a profession, a life partner. These are choices that constitute who we
are. As a result, they by no means concern solely banalities and trivialities.
3.3. Civil Disobedience and the Right to Do Wrong
But even if we were to put aside these objections and accept, for the sake of argu-
ment, the coherence of a right to do wrong, a moral right to whistleblowing would
still remain problematic. According to their own reasoning, those who support a
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right to do wrong must allow whistleblowing even when it is not the right thing to
do. Such a train of thought led Raz (1979, 268) to caution proponents of a moral
right to civil disobedience as follows: “Those who hold that there is a right to civil
disobedience are committed to the view that in general the rightness of the cause
contributes not at all to the justification of civil disobedience.” A right to civil
disobedience would thus entitle one to disobey even when one ought not to.
Proponents of a moral right to civil disobedience, however, have bitten the bullet
and affirmed that even if an agent engages in civil disobedience with the aim of
amending a just law and substituting it with a law she deems more just but which
is actually worse (from the standpoint of justice), she still acts within her moral
rights (Lefkowitz 2007, 224ff.; cf. Brownlee 2012, 141). Let us consider one such
argument, put forward by David Lefkowitz.
His reasoning is as follows: Though I may recognize the political beliefs of others
to be reasonable, I can still conclude that they are erroneous. I cannot, however,
(nor can society as a whole) demand that they refrain from advocating their
reasonable but wrong beliefs. The reason why is grounded in Rawls’s concept of
reasonable disagreement. Rawls (2005, 58) maintains that “[m]any of our most
important judgments are made under conditions where it is not to be expected that
conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will
arrive at the same conclusion.” Given the burdens of judgment, we therefore ought
to recognize the “right to advocate for the adoption in law or policy of reasonable
views [people] sincerely believe to be true, even when they are not” (Lefkowitz
2007, 232). We ought to recognize, in other words, the right to do wrong in the
sphere of politics. If, instead, one limits the sphere of free political agency to the
promotion of ends we believe to be morally valuable, that would prevent us from
leading an autonomous life, one in which agents themselves decide on the
direction their lives will take.
The next crucial step made by proponents of a moral right to civil disobedience
is to subsume the said right under the more general right of political participation
(ibid., 213) or freedom of expression (Brownlee 2012, 140ff.). Lefkowitz, for
example, argues that members of a position that is not supported by the majority
in a vote may well be justified in feeling that if there had been more time to
deliberate and if they had had more resources to help spread their message,
perhaps they would have gained more support and eventually won over the
majority. Acknowledgment of this fact leads us to recognize that the right to
political participation not only consists in a right to vote, but also in a right to
continue to challenge the decision reached by a majority rule procedure, not only
by means of legal forms of protest but also through civil disobedience (Lefkowitz
2007, 213). Punishing a person for engaging in an act of civil disobedience thus
demonstrates the state’s lack of respect for that person as someone who has a moral
right like anyone else to participate in the decision-making process that determines
the laws and policies regulating our collective life, even after a decision has been
made. Consequently, Lefkowitz concludes that “to punish a person for engaging in
public disobedience is equivalent to punishing a person for exercising the right to
vote or the right to free speech” (ibid., 219). Furthermore, given reasonable
disagreement about what justice requires, it becomes problematic to limit the moral
right to civil disobedience to the promotion of what we consider to be morally
good causes. The moral right to civil disobedience must therefore include a right to
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engage in civil disobedience in order to promote wrongful ends. An additional
reason Lefkowitz gives is that, although we may wish to encourage agents to only
autonomously choose morally good ends, the “only way to do so [. . .] involves
creating space within which agents may choose their ends, projects, and so on”
(ibid. 227), be those ends good or bad. If instead we only grant agents the right to
engage in political participation when we judge their decisions to be morally just,
we are in effect denying them the possibility of an autonomous life.
I do not have the space to discuss the merits of this argument with regard to
civil disobedience, though there are certainly some problematic assumptions,
particularly the strong claims that a state’s authority is only legitimate if the state
recognizes a moral right to civil disobedience (ibid. 209), and that treating its
citizens as persons requires the state to acknowledge such a right (ibid., 219).
Instead, what I wish to show is merely that this argument does not succeed in
justifying a moral right to classified public whistleblowing.
3.4. No Moral Right to Classified Public Whistleblowing Based on a Moral
Right to Do Wrong
As an (ideally) public-spirited breach of one’s obligations, one might be inclined to
compare whistleblowing to civil disobedience. There are, however, significant
differences.24 Most relevant for our purposes is, first, the observation that the effects
are different: Usually, an act of civil disobedience does not immediately result in
the reform or repeal of the contested law. It is more often a long process that
requires the involvement of a great many people, both within and without the
sphere of government, to bring about change. By contrast, a whistleblower can, all
by herself, disclose a great many classified documents, thus immediately undoing
the decision made by our democratically elected leaders to keep something secret.
Second, civil disobedience and whistleblowing differ significantly in terms of the
possible harm they involve. For example, the former does not generally involve a
threat to national security, whereas this is a possibility in the case of whistle-
blowing, given the nature of the documents disclosed. Additionally, unauthorized
disclosures may result in harm to undercover agents or to ongoing military opera-
tions. These two important differences lead to the conclusion that, whatever the
case may be regarding civil disobedience, there can be no right to whistleblowing
based on a moral right to do wrong.
Let us start with fleshing out the consequences of the first difference. The differ-
ence is that civil disobedience, just like whistleblowing, may involve the violation
of law, but that acts of civil disobedience do not immediately result in the repeal of
the contested law. On the other hand, whistleblowing, immediately, performatively
as it were, undoes the decision to classify certain information. What distinguishes
whistleblowing from civil disobedience, then, is that it involves a usurpation of
power, the power to classify information, whereas civil disobedience activists
merely protest against a particular policy that they oppose and aim to have
reformed or repealed entirely by the democratic authority. Whistleblowers can
24 Here I partially follow Candice Delmas’s (2016) first two differences between whistleblowing
and civil disobedience. Her third difference is not relevant for my purposes, namely, that the
penalties are significantly higher for whistleblowing than for civil disobedience.
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certainly have a similar aim, but the act of whistleblowing, in addition, involves
the appropriation of the power to determine what ought and what ought not to be
a legitimate state secret, whereas this is properly the prerogative of our demo-
cratically elected officials and not of private individuals.25 This renders whistle-
blowing wrongful in a way not imagined by Lefkowitz in his discussion of civil
disobedience. The problem is not merely that whistleblowers may pursue morally
problematic ends, but that, in whistleblowing, they arrogate to themselves political
power that properly belongs to our democratic representatives. The question is
whether the right to do wrong can also accommodate such wrongdoing.
The second difference between civil disobedience and whistleblowing was that
the effects of whistleblowing may also be more harmful than those of civil dis-
obedience. Granting a moral right to whistleblowing that would include the right to
disclose classified information even when it is the wrong thing to do (as argued with
regard to the moral right to civil disobedience), is therefore not advisable. It is
widely acknowledged among the advocates of a moral right to do wrong that
certain wrongs are so grievous that they cannot be protected by the right.26 It is my
contention that the wrong involved in wrongful whistleblowing is precisely of this
sort. An injudicious disclosure could have serious consequences, more so than an
ill-advised exercise of civil disobedience. Naturally, there may be harm involved in
civil disobedience, but the potential harm that could ensue from whistleblowing is
of a different degree. Classified information may fall into the wrong hands,
potentially endangering national security, field agents, or ongoing military opera-
tions. The case of Morton Seligman (Brennan 2013) offers a clear illustration of the
risks involved in a right to engage in wrongful whistleblowing: During the Second
World War, Seligman leaked decoded messages of the Imperial Japanese Navy to a
journalist. Subsequently, the Chicago Tribune ran an article stating that the U.S. Navy
was in possession of details of the Japanese navy’s battle plans without, however,
explicitly revealing the fact that the Americans had broken the Japanese code.
Somehow, the Japanese never caught on, but if they had, Seligman’s actions could
have significantly harmed the American war effort, as the Japanese would almost
certainly have developed another code. Given the possibility of such serious harm
involved in wrongful disclosures, there can be no moral right to engage in wrongful
or misguided whistleblowing, even with the help of a moral right to do wrong.
4. A Justification Defense for Whistleblowers
In this article I have argued that the most common defense of whistleblowing,
which is based on individual rights, be they conceived as legal or moral rights, fails
as a defense of whistleblowing. If the defense is based on legal rights it fails, first
because there can be no such thing as a legal right to break the law; second,
because the conception of rights involved in the defense deviates problematically
from our common understanding of rights. Third, and finally, the legal
25 We discussed this point earlier when identifying the third reason why classified public
whistleblowing constitutes a pro tanto wrong, namely, because it violates the obligation to
respect the democratic allocation of power.
26 See, e.g., Herstein 2012, 359: “one’s autonomy interests in a right to do wrong are most likely
never weighty enough to justify a right to highly egregious wrongdoing.”
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rights-based defense misrepresents the reasons for offering some protection to
whistleblowers: We do not wish to grant a defense because whistleblowing is a
fundamental human interest to which all individuals have a right. Instead,
unauthorized disclosures are of public importance; as a result, the defense ought
not to be based on individual rights but on the public role of whistleblowers.
Subsequently, granting the problematic position that moral rights need not
necessarily be possible legal rights, and granting that it makes sense to speak of a
moral right to do wrong (despite the availability of strong arguments against it),
I considered the argument for a moral right to civil disobedience even when such
disobedience serves a cause that is less just than the status quo in order to see
whether it could be applied to the case of whistleblowing. I concluded that it could
not, given the significant differences between civil disobedience and whistle-
blowing. In particular, due to the degree of wrongdoing involved in wrongful
exercises of a supposed right to whistleblowing, such a right is out of the question.
In closing, having established that there are insurmountable problems with a
defense of whistleblowing based on individual rights, be they moral or legal rights,
I will briefly consider a possible alternative defense for whistleblowers. The most
attractive option seems to be a justification defense that can function either as a
complete defense or as a sentencing mitigation factor.27 If one claims the action
was justified, one concedes criminal wrongdoing, but denies that it was, all things
considered, the wrong thing to do (e.g., A admits to having assaulted B, but argues
that her action was justified, given the fact that B had assaulted her first and she
therefore acted out of self-defense). By comparison, when invoking an excuse, one
concedes that the action was wrongful (both criminally and morally), but seeks to
avoid the attribution of responsibility for that action (e.g., A admits to having
wrongfully assaulted B, but given her mental condition it would be wrong to
attribute responsibility for the act to her).28 In practice, the statement that classified
public whistleblowing may be justified, means, according to this understanding of
justification, that such whistleblowing remains criminal. This enables the law to
still attach significant risks to whistleblowing, which can help prevent the occur-
rence of frivolous and willfully false disclosures, while at the same time offering
protection to those cases of whistleblowing that are justified. A justification defense
thus achieves the right balance between the prevention of undesirable acts and the
protection of justified whistleblowing, allowing the latter to continue to fulfill its
vital public function of bringing grave government wrongdoing to light.
I have argued that classified public whistleblowing is to be viewed as a pro tanto
wrong (for the reasons given early in Section 3.1). Calling an action X pro tanto
wrong means that there are moral reasons against performing it. Accordingly, if
one performs X anyway, a justification will be needed. Let me end by providing an
outline29 of the conditions that, when met, could justify unauthorized disclosures.
27 Yochai Benkler’s (2014) public accountability defense would be an example of such a defense.
28 See for such accounts of the distinction between justifications and excuses, among others:
Austin 1956, 2, and Fletcher 2000, 759.
29 For lack of space, I cannot discuss these conditions as elaborately as I would like. For a more
exhaustive treatment of these conditions (and their application), see Boot 2017. I have been
influenced here mainly by the conditions developed by the European Court of Human Rights in
its case law (see, e.g., Guja v. Moldova at n. 10), though I do not accept all of those conditions.
In particular, I reject the good faith requirement.
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First, and most importantly, such disclosures ought to reveal grave government
wrongdoing, understood both in a substantive and a procedural sense. Examples
of substantive wrongdoing are corruption, human rights violations, and abuse of
power. Procedural wrongdoing consists not so much in carrying out clearly unjust
policies, but rather in surreptitiously executing policies and programs of great
magnitude on the justness and desirability of which reasonable people may
disagree, thus rendering public debate on matters of public concern impossible. To
clarify the distinction, consider Snowden’s disclosures. As the NSA surveillance
programs constituted a violation of constitutional rights (e.g., to privacy), his dis-
closures unveiled substantive wrongdoing. However, they also revealed procedural
wrongdoing: Due to the secretive nature of certain surveillance programs, there
had been no public debate about their desirability. As a result, no real democratic
engagement with these matters had taken place prior to Snowden’s disclosures,
which can thus be said to have had a democracy-enhancing effect. When the infor-
mation disclosed reveals either substantive wrongdoing or demonstrates the willful
obstruction of the democratic process in cases in which policies of great magnitude
are at stake (i.e., procedural wrongdoing), then the information is of fundamental
public interest. Let us call this first, most important condition the public interest
condition.
In addition, there are two procedural conditions: The ultimum remedium condition,
first of all, stipulates that one ought to exhaust all alternative, more discreet
channels of addressing wrongdoing before going public. In practice, this means
one ought to first address the matter internally or to an external supervisory body.
Both options make it possible to investigate and address the wrongdoing
(including taking measures against those responsible) or to explain why, in fact, no
wrongdoing has occurred, without immediately involving the larger public.
However, if both these channels have been exhausted to no effect, or if the whistle-
blower reasonably believes that pursuing them would be futile, or that they would
result in the destruction of evidence, or lead to reprisals against the whistleblower
or a third party, or if the information concerns an imminent risk or threat “to the
life, health, and safety of persons, or to the environment” (Open Society Founda-
tions 2013, Tshwane Principle 40(a)), then the information may be disclosed to the
public, ideally through an established media outlet.
Unauthorized disclosures can have various harmful consequences: They may
disclose the identities of undercover agents, thus placing them at great risk;
national security could be harmed by publicizing military documents which the
enemy could use to its advantage; and public trust may be needlessly damaged
if the disclosed information proves to be untrue or biased. In order to prevent
such harm, whistleblowers must comply with the harm minimization condition,
which requires them to diligently edit the information, redacting any information
not strictly needed to demonstrate the wrongdoing in question, and to refrain from
disclosing any information that may lead to harm to private individuals or to
national security. In order to comply with this condition, whistleblowers would be
well-advised to collaborate with news outlets that have the required expertise and
experience to carefully edit the information and to place it in the right context to
enable the public to adequately receive and comprehend it.
Depending on whether all or only one or two of the conditions are met, this
justification defense can function either as a full defense or as a sentencing
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mitigation factor. Here it must be noted that the three conditions do not carry equal
weight. Rather, the public interest condition is a threshold condition. In other words,
if it is not met, the whole process of assessing the justifiability of a concrete case
of whistleblowing ends immediately. Viewing the public interest condition as a
threshold condition indicates its preponderance over the two procedural
conditions. The reason is that civil servants do not blow the whistle in order to
minimize harm or to verify the authenticity of documents. Instead, they do so in
order to reveal grave government wrongdoing. One may have taken measures to
mitigate harm, but that alone does not justify an act of whistleblowing if the
disclosed information is not of fundamental public concern.
Although I have admittedly provided only an outline of this justification defense
for whistleblowers, and its application in practice still needs to be clarified, I hope
to have shown at least its general shape and function as well as why it is such an
appealing option. A justification defense would avoid the problems shown to exist
with an individual rights-based defense, while maintaining the prohibition of
unauthorized disclosures (the deterrent effect of which can help prevent misguided
or willfully false disclosures), and providing legal protection for those whistle-
blowers whose actions are justified.
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